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Abstract
Political parties strive for maximizing their vote shares. One way
to achieve this goal is to attract voters from competitors. A precon-
dition for strategies aiming at attracting these voters is that parties
perceive their voter potentials among their rivals’ electorates correctly.
Yet, hardly anything is known about such perceptions. To fill this gap,
we develop analogue measures of a party’s perceived and its actual
voter potential for each competitor in a party system. Combining elite
and mass surveys conducted in Germany, we show that perceived and
actual voter potentials depend on spatial considerations but also that
not all parties are able to correctly evaluate their potentials. These
deviations can be traced back to differences in the perceived place-
ment of political actors between elites and citizens. This supports the
spatial logic of party competition, but it also points to potential pit-
falls for strategic behavior of political parties.
Keywords: spatial models, party competition, voter potentials,
parties’ perceptions
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1 Introduction1
Do political parties perceive their voter potential among the electorates of
rival parties correctly? Operating under conditions in which strategic deci-
sions regarding policy shifts are necessary but also potentially very costly, this
question is of utmost importance for political parties as it is a precondition
to make correct decisions in order to maximize their vote share. Most of the
extensive literature analyzing parties’ strategic behavior (cf. Adams 2012)
is grounded in the spatial theory of party competition (Downs 1957). This
framework assumes that parties possess information on where their voter
potential is located in the competitive space and are therefore able to be-
have strategically. This postulation is especially prominent in research on
strategic party re-positioning and adaptation to competitor parties, suggest-
ing that parties adapt their left-right position in response to public opinion
shifts (Adams et al. 2004; Adams et al. 2006; Ezrow et al. 2011) and to left-
right shifts of rival parties (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009; Williams 2015).
Yet, there is to date no study testing whether parties are actually accurately
informed about their voter potentials.
In this paper, we test this core assumption of spatial models empirically
by asking in how far political parties perceive their potentials to win vot-
ers from other parties correctly. Thereby, we reconsider the most important
precondition for political parties’ ability to position themselves strategically
when trying to increase their vote shares. Based on the traditional spatial
approach to party competition, which argues that voters’ party preferences
are primarily driven by spatial proximities, we hypothesize that parties’ per-
ceptions of voter potentials are structured by such as well. More specifically,
we investigate the match between a receiving party’s perception of its voter
potential among the voters of a second party — the target party — on the
one hand and the potential the former actually has among the electorate
of the latter on the other hand. We do so by combining unique data from
the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES) candidate survey on the
perceptions of voter potentials with data on actual voter potentials derived
from the GLES post-election cross section survey. Electoral candidates for
1Earlier drafts of this paper were presented at the 2018 ECPR General Conference in
Hamburg and at a workshop at the WZB Berlin Social Science Center. We would like to
thank all participants for their feedback, and particularly Susumu Shikano and Philippe
Joly for their comments. Furthermore, we are grateful to Arne Carstens and Lena Röllicke
for their help preparing the manuscript and to the anonymous reviewers for their useful
suggestions to improve the paper.
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national elections constitute the mid- to high-level party elites and are cru-
cial actors not only for campaign communication but also internally for the
parties’ organization and programmatic portfolio. Most strategically impor-
tant decisions might be made by a small circle of party officials; however,
even these decisions will be strongly influenced by electoral candidates.
Additionally, we analyze why parties perceive their voter potentials (in-
)correctly. We argue that spatial perceptions can vary between parties and
voters, potentially distorting parties’ perceptions of voter potentials among
their competitors’ electorates. Our findings suggest that — while spatial con-
siderations regarding the left-right dimension are relevant for both perceived
and, to an even stronger degree, actual voter potential — not all parties are
equally able to perceive their voter potential correctly. These deviations can
be traced back to differences between parties and citizens when it comes to
locating political actors in the competitive space.
Understanding the factors leading to voter potential misperceptions is
crucial as such misperceptions can have severe practical consequences for
parties’ ability to maximize their vote share. We conclude that future re-
search not only has to take into account differences in locating parties but
also has to incorporate non-spatial factors for a more comprehensive picture.
Such additional knowledge could help to refine models of party competition
and their theoretical underpinnings.
2 Theoretical considerations
There is a vast amount of literature investigating parties’ strategic behavior
to maximize their vote shares (for a summary see Adams 2012. The ma-
jority of studies are based on assumptions derived from the spatial model
of party competition (Downs 1957) which provides both assumptions about
ideal party behavior as well as voter motivations for party choice.2 According
to this model, and following the rational-choice framework, citizens vote for
the party which they expect to yield the highest utility. In most accounts,
party utility is thought to be based primarily on spatial considerations:3 The
2Albeit much less common, spatial models can also be based on the idea of directional
voting and discounting for problems of policy implementation (Grofman 1985; Rabinowitz
and Macdonald 1989). In this study, we focus on the dominant proximity approach;
however, we believe that any argument provided here could be translated to the discounting
or directional approach as well.
3Certainly, party utility is not determined solely by spatial considerations. Among
others, voters use a variety of criteria, e.g. party identification (Campbell et al. 1960),
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closer a party’s policy preference is to a voter’s ideal point in a policy space,
the higher the utility. Clearly, such considerations necessitate an unrealistic
and costly amount of information on the part of the voter. Voters not only
have to develop preferences on a multitude of policy issues but also have to
be aware of the respective issue positions of all parties. Therefore, Downs
(and others) argued that instead of several specific issue dimensions, citizens
rely on one-dimensional simplifications — the most important one being the
left-right dimension (Mair 2009). Consequently, voters only have to assess
their proximity to parties regarding the left-right dimension to derive a utility
for every party.
Looking to developments of party systems and electoral behavior all over
the world, we acknowledge that a more fitting description of the competitive
space might be a two-dimensional description which distinguishes a socio-
economic and a socio-cultural dimension (e.g., Kitschelt and McGann 1995.
However, recent research suggests that left-right, while non-linearly related
to positions in the two-dimensional space, still represents a crucial orientation
for voters (Lachat 2018) and that, for example, perceptions of party positions
regarding the left-right dimension can be explained by perceptions regarding
the sub-dimensions as well as the salience of these sub-dimensions (Giebler
and Wagner 2019).4 Furthermore, focusing on left-right as the super issue of
political competition (Fuchs and Klingemann 1989) is still the most widely
used approach in comparative studies of party and electoral competition In
comparative contexts, the left-right dimension can be considered favorable as
it ”makes it possible to circumnavigate the potentially intractable problem of
how to establish the equivalence of policy issues across countries (as well as
across elections within the same country)” (Schmitt-Beck 2019). In addition,
all arguments developed below can be translated to an n-dimensional policy
space. Therefore, we stick to the classic, one-dimensional left-right approach.
performance evaluations (Fiorina 1981) or strategic considerations (Duverger 1963) to
decide which party to vote for. However, the focus of this study lies on the role spatial
factors play with regards to parties’ perceptions of their voter potentials, providing some
novel but also easy to comprehend testing. Adding non-spatial considerations to the
equation clearly constitutes an important step for additional, follow-up research but also
constitutes to a certain degree a second step before the first. Nevertheless, the spatial
arguments outlined in this section are validated by robustness checks which also include
the most fundamental non-spatial factors (see end of results section and the supplementary
material).
4Below, we validate the relevance of the left-right dimension for the purpose of our study
empirically (see methods section and tables A1 and A2 in the supplementary material).
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Although in most electoral systems, voters can only cast one vote, a per-
son might consider several parties before deciding which one to vote for.
After having derived a respective utility for every competing party, a voter
arrives at a specific consideration set, which represents a subset of parties
with high(er) utility from which the voter actually chooses (van der Brug
et al. 2007). In addition, as the parties in the consideration set share high
utility, we can assume that vote-switching between these parties is likely in
future elections.
Translated to the political supply side of parties, we argue that this vote-
switching potential implies that all parties included in the consideration set
of a voter can conceive of this individual as a potential voter. In other words,
political parties’ voter potentials can be derived from the voters’ considera-
tion sets, thus including actual voters as well as those citizens who at least
consider voting for the respective party. According to Bartolini (2002), such
voter potentials are crucial for democracy as they lead political parties to re-
spond to (changing) voter preferences, thereby ensuring the unintended value
of political competition: responsiveness due to vulnerability. The voter po-
tential of a party basically consists of two distinct groups: the first group
is constituted by a party’s voters. If political actors feel vulnerable, they
try to adapt to the policy preferences of their voters to keep them aligned.
However, vote maximizing is not limited to reacting to vulnerability but also
refers to attracting as many voters as possible — and in the context of inter-
party competition, it is especially winning over voters from rival parties that
is of relevance. Hence, our focus lies on this second group, those citizens who
do not yet vote for the party but consider doing so. It is this latter aspect
of political competition between parties that we are interested in. Corre-
spondingly, parties are assumed to adapt in a strategic way to attract voters
of rival parties. This becomes possible if these voters perceive the party as
being part of their consideration set.5
In the literature, it is predominantly the Downsian model that is used to
theorize these adaptive processes. The basic spatial model of party behavior
suggests that parties aim to maximize their vote share and hence try to min-
imize their spatial distance to as many potential voters as possible. Clearly,
not all parties are equally oriented towards vote-maximizing or vote-seeking
(Strøm 1989). However, regardless which strategy a party is primarily follow-
ing, it needs to correctly assess their voter potentials among other parties in
5Theoretically speaking, parties could aim to attract voters regardless of the specific
nature of their considerations set. However, from a rational perspective and due to limited
resources, such an unguided strategy seems both risky and unpromising.
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order to take office or facilitate their policy goals. As Adams (2012) concludes
in his literature review, several hypotheses regarding the re-positioning vis-á-
vis competitor parties derived from this rational-choice perspective of party
positioning are supported by comparative analyses. Parties adapt their left-
right position in response to public opinion shifts (Adams et al. 2004; Adams
et al. 2006; Ezrow et al. 2011) and, more importantly for our argument, to
left-right shifts of rival parties (Adams and Somer-Topcu 2009), taking these
shifts as information on the rival parties’ voters’ location. In a more recent
study, Williams (2015) finds that ideologically close parties competing for
the same bloc of voters adapt their ideological positions vis-á-vis each other
more often than ideologically distant parties.
While these are very important findings, they are only approximations
to measure parties’ perceptions of their voter potentials among their rival
parties’ electorates. All studies following Downs seminal work are based on
the assumption that political parties continuously (re)adapt their policy po-
sitions to reflect each new configuration of party support by voters (Laver
2005, p. 266). This implies that parties are assumed to act as if they knew
where their voter potentials are located. However, whether they actually
perceive their electoral potentials among rival parties correctly has not been
tested yet. Reconsidering the theoretical arguments of the spatial model of
party competition, we thus contribute to the literature by providing such a
test to shed light on one of the core assumptions of spatial models of party
competition. How parties perceive their electoral potentials among other par-
ties and whether their perceptions are correct is still an almost unexplored
field.6 Our study, therefore, extends the classical literature in the field of
political competition. First, we ask whether political parties’ perceptions of
their potentials to win voters from other parties are indeed driven by spatial
considerations. As discussed above, the literature on voters’ consideration
sets supports the claim that they are substantively structured by left-right
proximities (van der Eijk and Niemöller 1983; Tillie 1995; Wagner 2017). We
do not know whether parties’ perceptions are structured in the same way,
but earlier research at least suggests that they do react to spatial factors.
As the original work of Downs argues that voters and parties alike perceive
6To our knowledge the only notable study in this context was conducted by Weßels
(2016). However, his study focuses on the perception of candidates running for seats in
German single-member districts and their individual campaigning instead of general party
strategies. Nevertheless, the findings are consistent with our approach as Weßels concludes
that the perceptions of chances to win votes from another party’s candidate are driven,
among other factors, by spatial considerations, namely left-right proximities.
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competition in a one-dimensional space, we formulate the following hypoth-
esis:
H1: The closer a party perceives a rival party to be located regarding the
left-right dimension, the higher it perceives its potential to win voters from
the respective rival.
Secondly, we investigate whether political parties perceive their voter
potentials among other parties’ electorates correctly. Here, we follow the
implicit assumption underlying research on parties’ strategic (re-)positioning
that parties have at least some reliable information on where their actual
voter potentials are located. Probably, this information is far from per-
fect. Downs (1957, 45, 62, 77f) himself already acknowledged model-inherent
problems due to uncertainty and lack of information on the parties’ side
with regards to voters’ policy preferences. However, for the spatial model
of competition to work, there has to be some positive relationship between
perceived and actual voter potentials:
H2: Political parties’ perceptions of their voter potentials among other par-
ties’ electorates correspond to their actual voter potentials.
Any misperception of such voter potential can have severe consequences,
not only for the parties themselves but also for the working of representative
democracies: Strategic behavior by parties aiming at increasing their vote
shares and also behavior aiming at being responsive becomes ineffective or
even counter-productive if the competitive situation is perceived incorrectly.
Hence, it seems crucial to understand the reasons leading to such potential
misperceptions. A precondition for the correct perception of the potential to
attract new voters is that both perceived and actual potentials are based on
a similar logic, in this case competition regarding the left-right dimension.
We know that this is the case for voters. By testing our first hypothesis
(H1), we test if this applies to parties as well. Nevertheless, even if parties’
perceptions and voters’ considerations sets are indeed defined by a Downsian
logic, possible differences might occur. If one party (the possibly receiving
party) perceives another party (the target party) to be relatively close in
terms of left-right, whereas the voters of the target party see vast differences
between the left-right positions of both parties, the receiving party will over-
estimate the potential to attract voters from that specific target party —
despite relying on the same logic to come to this conclusion. This argument
is again supported by Downs himself and the incorporation of uncertainty
into his model. It is not only parties that lack fully correct perceptions of
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voters’ policy preferences but also voters who are uncertain where parties are
actually positioned (van der Eijk and Niemöller 1983; Tillie 1995; Wagner
2017). Following up on this, many previous studies show, for example, that
voters do not unanimously perceive party positions or their shifts correctly
due to various factors such as information provided by the media or vary-
ing issue saliency (Alvarez and Franklin 1994; Banducci et al. 2017; Busch
2016; Plescia and Staniek 2017; Adams et al. 2011). At the same time, left-
right constitutes a ”super issue” (Klingemann and Inglehart 1976, p. 244)
or an ”amorphous vessel” (Huber and Inglehart 1995, p. 90) without a fixed
meaning for different actors or in different contexts. This can also result
in variation of placements regarding the left-right dimension. Hence, parties
might be limited in maximizing their vote gains even when behaving strategi-
cally. We therefore assume that different perceptions of left-right proximities
between voters and parties lead to deviations of political parties’ perceived
potential from their actual potential. More precisely, if parties perceive big-
ger distances between themselves and the target party than voters do, we
expect them to underestimate their potentials. At the same time, bigger
perceived left-right distances on the voters’ side should lead to overestimated
potentials. Hence, we formulate a third hypothesis to be tested in this study:
H3: Parties’ ability to correctly perceive their voter potentials depends on
the correspondence of perceptions of left-right proximities between parties and
voters.
As mentioned above, party utility is not determined by spatial prox-
imities alone. Hence, it seems obvious that (biases of) parties’ perceptions
of voter potentials are not only a function of spatial factors. In our con-
text, non-spatial qualities of the receiving and target parties might also play
a role. For example, research on party utility has argued that party size
is a relevant characteristic predicting party utility for voters (Tillie 1995;
van der Eijk et al. 1996). Hence, as we assume certain similarities between
parties and voters, party size might as well influence parties’ perceptions of
voter potentials and their perceptions of ideological proximities. Although
our study explicitly focusses on (testing assumptions of) the spatial model
of party competition as a necessary first step, we control for party size and
a number of additional non-spatial factors in the robustness section below.
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3 Data and Operationalization
We analyze the match between parties’ perceptions and their actual voter
potentials at the 2017 federal elections in Germany to investigate in how far
political parties (are able to) perceive their potentials to attract voters from
other parties correctly. While our arguments and framework are applicable to
all multi-party electoral contexts, it requires comparable data on the elite as
well as mass level which is not available for many countries at this point. For
this study, we combine data from the 2017 candidate survey (Roßteutscher
et al. 2018b) and the 2017 post-election voter survey (Roßteutscher et al.
2018a) of the German Longitudinal Election Study (GLES).7 There are sev-
eral reasons why Germany in general and the 2017 elections in particular
constitute a good test case for our theoretical arguments. The dominance of
proportional representation in the German mixed-member system results in
a multi-party system providing voters with multiple opportunities to switch
votes not only from government to opposition parties (or vice versa) but also
within the camps of opposition and government parties. Steadily increasing
volatility levels since the 2000s — with an all-time record in 2017 — show
that people indeed use those vote switching opportunities and its relevance
at the election under consideration. Related to that, for the first time since
the German unification in 1990 a new, right-wing populist party gained par-
liamentary representation, the Alternative for Germany (AfD). Building on
state-level electoral success and the salience of immigration issues, they de-
veloped into a major competitor in the 2017 election. The growing success of
the AfD did not only change the number of relevant political parties compet-
ing for votes but also decreased the German party systems stability in terms
of its moderate ideological polarization (Arzheimer 2015). In such situations
it is particularly difficult for political parties to correctly perceive their ac-
tual voter potentials. Thus, this provides us with a rather conservative test.
Finding patterns for the 2017 election in Germany makes it highly plausi-
ble that similar patterns can be found in more stable party systems.8 At the
same time, characteristics similar to those just outlined can be found in most
European democracies and beyond, which gives this study some additional
weight when inferring validity of our results for other contexts.
7Detailed information on the studies and their design can be found in the study de-
scriptions (Roßteutscher et al. 2018a, 2018b).
8In the robustness test section below, we also show that our arguments hold for the
2013 German federal election which took place under substantively different conditions.
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Our measure of the parties’ perceptions is derived from the candidate
survey that was carried out immediately after the 2017 election. The popu-
lation comprises all candidates of the six biggest and most relevant political
parties in Germany: the conservative Christian Democratic Union/ Christian
Social Union (CDU/CSU; Union),9 the Social Democratic Party of Germany
(SPD), the Alliance 90/the Greens (Greens), the post-socialist Left, the lib-
eral Free Democratic Party (FDP), and the right-wing populist Alternative
for Germany (AfD). The candidate survey provides us with the unique op-
portunity to base our party measure on data of a large N mid- to high-level
elite survey. Similar approaches have been successfully used to measure party
policy positions (Giger and Lefkofridi 2014; Önnudóttir 2014),10 campaign
strategies and efforts (Karlsen and Skogerbø 2015; Giebler and Wüst 2011)
or, more recently, a party’s degree of populism (Lewandowsky et al. 2016).
Electoral candidates for national elections constitute crucial actors not
only for campaign communication but also internally for the party’s organi-
zation and programmatic portfolio. Depending on the organizational struc-
ture, the most important decisions might still be made by a small circle of
party officials. However, as the party leadership has to rely on the support
of mid- and lower-level elites and also has to ensure some party homogeneity,
it seems highly likely that perspectives of these elites provide crucial guide-
lines and information for strategic decision-making. Hence, how candidates
perceive their parties’ voter potential among other parties’ electorates is im-
portant for strategic behavior even in a situation in which candidates are not
making strategic decisions directly.
The candidate survey enables us to develop not only a direct but also valid
measure of the perceived voter potential (PVP) by using a survey item called
”propensities to win votes” (PTWV). The candidates were asked to evaluate
the probability that their party will ever win votes from other parties. For
each competitor, respondents were asked to express their evaluation on an
11-point scale, ranging from 1 = ”not at all probable to win votes” to 11 =
”very probable to win votes”.11
9Due to the special relationship of the CDU and CSU with the latter only competing
in Bavaria and the former not competing there and also because the two parties form a
single faction in the federal parliament, we follow common practice and treat them as a
single party.
10For a more detailed discussion of, e.g., the advantages and disadvantages of different
techniques to derive party policy positions see de Swaan (1973), Mair (2001) or Banducci
et al. (2017).
11A table with summary statistics of all our variables can be found in the supplementary
material (Table A3).
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Our measure of PVP is an aggregate measure on a party pair level, i.e.
we determine the perceived voter potentials of party r with regards to party t
(PV Prt). PV Prt represents the mean PTWV which the candidates of party
r express for the electorate of party t. Our units of analysis are therefore
combinations of receiving (party r) and target parties (party t). Since we are
dealing with six parties, this leaves us with 30 receiving-target party pairs.
For our measure of the actual voter potential (AVP) receiving parties have
among the electorate of a specific target party, we use data from the post-
election voter study. We measure AVPs using ”propensities to vote” (PTV),
that resemble the PTWVs on the political demand side. Respondents —
in this case voters — were asked for their individual probability to ever
vote for the different political parties on an 11-point scale ranging from 1
= ”not at all probable” to 11 = ”very probable.”12 Going back to van der
Eijk and Niemöller (1983), PTVs are an established tool in electoral research
to measure party utility and, based on that, to depict voters’ consideration
sets as well as voter potentials of political parties (Kroh et al. 2007; Marsh
2006; Tillie 1995; Van Der Eijk and Oppenhuis 1991; Wagner 2017). To
derive AVPs, we aggregate individual-level PTVs for all voters of a party
with regards to each competitor. The equivalent to PV Prt (indicating the
voter potential party r perceives to have among the electorate of party t)
has to be a measure that represents the inclination of voters of party t to
vote for party r.13 Hence, party r’s potential among the electorate of party t
(AV Prt) equals the mean PTV score of party t’s voters for party r.
In order to test our hypotheses, we need to develop party and voter mea-
sures of perceived left-right proximities. Above, we argued that the left-right
dimension still represents a crucial orientation for voters. In an additional
analysis, we also show that this argument holds empirically.14 For the par-
12For Bavarian respondents, we replaced the PTV responses for the CDU with their
responses for the CSU.
13In national elections in Germany, citizens can cast two votes. Party voters are those
who reported voting for the respective party with their second vote (party vote) in the
2017 election.
14To validate the relevance of the left-right dimension explicitly for the purpose of our
study, we calculated three conditional logit models regressing vote choice at the German
Federal Election 2017 a) on perceived left-right proximities, b) on proximities regard-
ing three policy issues covering the most dominant sub-dimensions (immigration, wel-
fare/taxation, environmental protection) and c) on both. The results of the analyses as
well as some information on the operationalization can be found in the supplementary ma-
terial (Tables A1 and A2).They suggest, firstly, that left-right congruence does not only
exert an independent but also the strongest effect of all four predictors on vote choice.
Secondly, comparing the BICs of the general left-right dimensions and the policy issues
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ties’ perceived left-right proximities (PLRP), we calculate the absolute differ-
ence between the left-right position of receiving party r (LRr) and party r ’s
perceived left-right position of target party t (LRrt), where LRr is the mean
left-right placement of party r by its candidates and LRrt the mean left-right
placement of party t by party candidates measured on an 11-point scale. The
variable is then recoded so that higher values represent high proximities and
used to test Hypothesis 1. The similarities between AVPs and PVPs reveal
the validity of Hypothesis 2. We also hypothesize that deviations of PVPs
and AVPs are conditional on the variation of perceived positions on the
left-right dimension by parties and voters. For Hypothesis 3, the deviation
between the parties’ and voters’ perceived left-right proximities is measured
by subtracting PLRPrt from a corresponding measure for voters, V LRPrt.
15
For all measures based on the candidate survey, we use post-stratification
weights adjusting to the distribution of the population of all candidates re-
garding party affiliation, gender, age, and type of candidacy (constituency,
list, and dual candidacy) to additionally increase representativeness. Sim-
ilarly, we calculate all measures based on the voter survey using weights
adjusting for sampling design and non-response.
Although our analyses are based on only 30 party pairs, we need to ac-
count for the peculiar data structure with observations nested in a cross-
classification of receiving and target parties. We would not expect evalua-
tions of voter potentials by a receiving party to be independent when looking
at different target parties. At the same time, one and the same target party
is evaluated by each receiving party, which also sheds doubt on the inde-
pendence of estimation errors. Accordingly, we calculate standard errors
based on cross-classified multi-level linear regression models. Furthermore,
we need to take into account the small number of cases, especially on the
level of receiving and target parties. Here, we rely on existing methodological
model we see that the former actually fits the data better. Thus, we can conclude that
voters still use the left-right dimension as a heuristic when making their vote choice and
that the predictions do not improve if a more complex, multi-dimensional approach is
used.
15Using the voter survey, V LRPrt is based on the same left-right scale as used in the
candidate survey. However, the measure has to be calculated in relative terms to the
respondents’ left-right position to be in line with the logic of the spatial voting model. We
first determine the mean left-right proximity between party t ’s voters and their left-right
placement of party t (LRPego−t). Secondly, we calculate the mean left-right proximity
between party t ’s voters and their left-right placement of party r (LRPego−r). We then
take the absolute difference of LRPego−t and LRPego−r to get V LRPrt.
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work which argues that restricted maximum-likelihood estimation as well as
significance thresholds based on Satterthwaite’s Degrees of Freedom approx-
imation result in valid estimates (Elff et al. 2020).
4 Results
For our analyses, we start with providing some descriptive information on our
main variable — the perceived voter potential (PVP). Fig. 1 displays PVP
scores for each of the 30 party pairs. The bars are grouped by the receiving
party and presented in alphabetical order. The vertical, dashed line refers to
the average perceived potential, which is 5.78 and, hence, slightly below the
midpoint of the PVP scale.
Figure 1: Perceived voter potential (PVP) by party pairs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11





































Note: Own calculations based on Roßteutscher et al. (2018b). The dashed line represents
the overall mean of PVP.
Several things become obvious: For one, there is tremendous variation
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between party pairs. The values range from 1.5 (it seems unlikely to the
Green party to win votes from the AfD) to 10.2 (from the perspective of the
AfD it is highly likely that they win votes from the Union). Overall, the
AfD is very optimistic as four out of five PVP scores are substantially larger
than the overall mean. In contrast, most of the other parties and especially
the Union perceive much lower voter potentials. Moreover, parties are in
general skeptical about winning voters from the AfD while there seems to
be a certain trend that voters of the SPD and the Union are seen as rather
approachable for other parties. Based on how German parties are usually
placed on the left-right dimension (e.g.,Kurella and Pappi 2015; Mader and
Schoen 2016), we can carefully conclude that being closer to a rival party
increases PVP scores — a first indication in support of our first hypothesis:
The right-wing populist AfD as well as the liberal FDP are most optimistic to
win voters from the Union, the Greens and the Left see the largest potentials
within the SPD electorate. Conversely, the highest PVP of the SPD is for
the Greens and of the Union for the FDP, respectively. To investigate the
relationship between the PVP and the parties’ perceived left-right proximities
to a rival party (PLRP) more systematically, we estimated a cross-classified
multi-level regression model with PVP as the dependent and PLRP as the
predictor variable to test our first hypothesis. We also present an analogous
model for actual voter potentials to validate the finding of previous studies
that consideration sets are determined by spatial considerations (van der Eijk
and Niemöller, 1983; Tillie, 1995; Wagner, 2017).
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Table 1: Predicting PVP and AVP with perceived left-right proximities
DV: PVP AVP
Perceived left-right proximity by parties (PLRP) 1.01∗∗∗
(0.13)





σ2 party pair-level 1.17 0.46
σ2 target pair-level 0.36 0.16
σ2 receiving pair-level 2.41 0.17
Adjusted R2 0.22 0.78
N party pairs 30 30
N receiving parties 6 6
N target parties 6 6
Note: Cross-classified models with two higher-level units resulting in three vari-
ance components. Own calculations based on Roßteutscher et al. (2018a; 2018b).
Standard errors are presented in brackets. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001;
significance levels based on Satterthwaite’s Degrees of Freedom approximation.
14
The first model in Table 1 shows a significant effect of left-right prox-
imities on PVP. In accordance with the theory of spatial party competition
and our first hypothesis, the higher the perceived ideological proximity is,
the higher perceived voter potentials become. This points to the fact, that
parties indeed perceive the electorate of ideologically close target parties as
likely voters. The second model supports this logic also for actual voter po-
tentials: If the proximity between the target party and its voters is similar to
the proximity between these voters and the receiving party, the AVP for the
latter is higher. Finally, we find that left-right distances seem to be much
more important for voters than for parties as the adjusted R2-values indicate
that the variance in AVPs can be much better explained by left-right proxim-
ities than the variance in PVPs.16 Both groups of actors perceive competition
from a spatial perspective but this seems to be much more the case for voters
than for parties. However, and this is important to emphasize, this neither
means that PVPs and AVPs for specific party pairs are identical, nor that
parties and voters locate parties identically on the left-right dimension. The
remainder of our analyses will deal with these two aspects represented in our
second and third hypothesis.
As a next step of our analysis, we compare PVPs to their AVPs, thereby
investigating whether parties actually know where their voter potentials
among other parties are located (Hypothesis 2). Fig. 2 shows the degree
to which a receiving party’s perception of being able to win votes from a
specific target party corresponds to the actual potential of voters of the lat-
ter party to defect to the receiving party. The figure consists of six subplots
— one for each of the parties under analysis. The diagonal lines represent a
perfect fit between PVP and AVP. Values above that line indicate a situation
in which the receiving party overestimates its electoral potential while values
below represent a higher AVP than actually perceived.
Overall, and with the clear exception of the AfD, PVP is similar to AVP
more often than not.17 This is especially true for the CDU/CSU, the Greens
and the SPD. However, there are some deviations from the diagonal line be-
yond the AfD, indicating that the parties’ PVPs among other parties only
moderately correspond to their AVPs.18 Notably, the four smaller opposi-
16How or even whether to calculate R2-values for multi-level models is a highly contested
issue. We follow the approach outlined by Hox (2010, p. 71).
17The supplementary material holds a combined figure showing all 30 data points (Figure
A1) which might allow for an easier grasp of the overall pattern.
18The correlation (N = 25) equals 0.68 if the AfD is excluded and drops to 0.18 with all
30 cases.
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tion parties tend to overestimate their voter potential — again, with the
AfD being much more overconfident than the other three parties — while
the CDU/CSU and the SPD tend to underestimate their potentials.19 There
is also a clear pattern when looking at the figure from a target-party per-
spective: Parties tend to overestimate their potential when it comes to the
SPD and CDU/CSU voters. In eight out of ten cases in which one of these
two parties is the target party, PVP is larger than AVP.



























































































Actual voter potential (AVP)
Note: Own calculations based on Roßteutscher et al. (2018a; 2018b).
Up to this point, we have shown that PVPs and AVPs are significantly
19In the robustness section below, we exclude cases involving the AfD as receiving or
target party from the analyses. This, however, does not change the results of any of the
models substantially. In other words, even if the AfD shows differences to other parties
in terms of the PVP or the difference between PVP and AVP, these differences can be
explained by the same logic as the other cases.
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determined by left-right spatial considerations, speaking in favor of our hy-
pothesis (H1), but also that actual voter potentials are structured much more
strongly by such considerations than parties’ perceptions. Against this back-
ground, our finding that perceptions are not equally correct in all instances
becomes plausible, speaking against a full validation of our second hypoth-
esis (H2). If voters strongly rely on simplifications in terms of the left-right
heuristic when developing their consideration sets while parties do not con-
sider left-right spatial considerations particularly relevant for determining
their voter potentials among rival parties, misperceptions of the latter come
as no surprise. However, we argued above (H3) that for the correctness of
PVP it is also decisive to what extent left-right positions are ascribed iden-
tically by parties and voters respectively. Calculating a simple correlation
between the two proximity measures results in a correlation coefficient of 0.77.
This clearly is a strong correlation, but as the two measures are supposed to
represent the same empirical feature only from different angles, namely, the
spatial structure of the German party system in the eyes of parties and voters
– the differences are considerable. For testing in how far different perceptions
of left-right proximities between parties and voters account for voter poten-
tial misperceptions, we run an additional regression with the same estimation
strategy as described above. The dependent variable is calculated by sub-
tracting AVP scores from PVP scores, implying that positive values indicate
an overestimation of electoral potential by the parties. We use the differences
in left-right perceptions between parties and voters to predict the deviation
between AVPs and PVPs. Any significant effect resembles a conditioning
effect of variations of perceived left-right placements.
Taking into account that we can only rely on a limited number of cases,
the model performs extremely well (Table 2). The coefficient measuring dif-
ferences in left-right proximities (PLRP minus VLRP) is positive and indeed
highly significant. Substantively, this shows that if a party perceives the
proximity to a target party as higher than the proximity is perceived by the
voters of the target party, it overestimates its voter potential. This finding
is clearly in line with our expectations. Left-right ideology plays an impor-
tant role not just in explaining perceived and actual voter potential but also
in explaining differences between the two, as stated in our third hypothe-
sis (H3). However, considering the rather low R2-value (0.21), differences in
left-right positioning alone do not seem to be sufficient for explaining misper-
ceptions of voter potentials. Spatial considerations matter, but parties and
voters come to different results when locating parties and it seems necessary
to think about additional factors able to explain differences in perceived and
actual potentials in future studies.
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Table 2: Explaining differences between PVP and AVP
DV: PVP minus AVP





σ2 party pair-level 0.96
σ2 target pair-level 0.86
σ2 receiving pair-level 3.90
Adjusted R2 0.21
N party pairs 30
N receiving parties 6
N target parties 6
Note: Cross-classified models with two higher-level units resulting in three variance
components. Own calculations based on Roßteutscher et al. (2018a; 2018b). Standard
errors are presented in brackets. ∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗ p < 0.01, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001; significance levels
based on Satterthwaite’s Degrees of Freedom approximation.
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5 Robustness Checks
All in all, the patterns we find are consistent with the theoretical argument.
Furthermore, we have chosen an appropriate estimation approach to deal
with the peculiar data structure. Nevertheless, it seems necessary to pro-
vide additional support for our findings before presenting our conclusions.
Therefore, we conducted a number of robustness checks for both our PVP
model (Table 1) and our model predicting the difference between PVP and
AVP (Table 2) by calculating several additional models. The estimated coef-
ficients for our left-right proximity variables and their 95 per cent confidence
intervals are plotted in Fig. 3. The left part of the figure shows the results
of the robustness checks for our PVP model and the right part of Fig. 3
presents those for the PVP-minus-AVP model. For comparison, we also
added the estimates from our main models presented in Tables 1 (PVP) and
2 (PVP-minus-AVP). Hence, the figure provides easily accessible informa-
tion on whether our predictors indeed have the expected effect regardless of
different model modifications.
First of all, the number of cases to test our theoretical argument is small,
resulting in vulnerability to outliers and influential cases. Jackknife testing
represents a typical approach to investigate the existence of influential cases.
Rerunning our main estimation models leaving out one case at a time (M1),
we are left with substantially identical confidence intervals for both models.20
Looking for influential cases can also be done from a theoretical point of
view. With the AfD, our analyses include a party showing very large devia-
tions between PVP and AVP. Furthermore, the AfD was still a rather young
party in 2017, which makes it more difficult for other parties to evaluate their
voter potentials among this specific target party’s electorate. Therefore, we
calculated two additional models for our PVP as well as for our PVP-minus-
AVP model. M2 excludes the AfD as the receiving and M3 as the target
party. From Fig. 3 we can deduce that there are, again, no substantial dif-
ferences between the models excluding cases with the AfD as a member of a
party pair and our main models.
Influential cases can be inspected from yet another perspective: by ac-
counting for heterogeneity at the level of the individual candidates. It seems
reasonable to assume that more experienced candidates perceive their par-
ties’ voter potential as well as spatial proximities differently or more accurate
20More information on the Jackknife estimations and the other models calculated for
the robustness checks can be found in section B of the supplementary material. For the
results of those models see Tables B2 and B3.
19
than inexperienced candidates, or that their perceptions are based on differ-
ent grounds.21
Another relevant distinction can be made with regards to the candidates’
positions within the party. In this respect, one could argue that perceptions
of candidates higher up the party ladder are more influential on the parties’
strategic orientations. Hence, we conducted additional analyses for 2017
comparing voter potential (mis-)perceptions of a) experienced and inexperi-
enced candidates and b) of elected and unelected candidates.22 First of all,
comparing the correlations of PVP- and AVP- scores reveals that, on average,
experienced candidates do not perceive the voter potentials of their parties
among other parties more correctly than inexperienced candidates. The same
applies to the distinction between elected and unelected candidates.23 Fur-
thermore, we calculated four additional PVP- and PVP-minus-AVP models,
for which PVP- and PLRP-scores were aggregated across the four different
subsamples of individual candidates mentioned above (M4 and M5). The re-
sults of Models M4 and M5 suggest that there are no substantial differences
with regards to the effects of our proximity measures between experienced
(M4a) and unexperienced candidates (M4b) and also not between elected
(M5a) and unelected candidates (M5b).
The second set of robustness tests concerns the electoral context. So far,
we only presented results for a single election in a single country. As an addi-
tional robustness test we applied our analytical models to a different context,
namely to that of the German Federal Elections of 2013. There are several
reasons why the patterns of party competition at the 2013 elections can be
considered significantly different from the situation in 2017. First of all, the
2013 elections took place under a liberal-conservative government coalition
(CDU/CSU and FDP) whereas in 2017, a grand coalition (CDU/CSU and
SPD) was in charge. Therefore, in the 2013 election campaign, a center-right
21At a first glance, one could also assume that low levels of experience could be an-
other factor driving the substantially less correct perceptions by the AfD. However, AfD
candidates are, on average, not substantially less experienced than those of the FDP or
the Left — two parties that have relatively realistic voter potential perceptions (cf. Table
B1 in the supplementary material). This relates to the fact that the AfD also attracted
politicians from other parties to their cause and not only political newcomers.
22We consider the status of being elected as being a proxy for a candidate’s standing or
influence within the party, respectively. For the operationalization of political experience
see Table B1 in the supplementary material.
23See also Figure B1 for a graphical representation of the strong similarity between the
groups.
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government ran against a center-left government-in-waiting. In contrast, in
2017, the two largest parties governed together, curbing the campaign’s in-
tensity. Moreover, the AfD had a different party profile than it has now,
showing a center-right rather than a far-right ideological position, resulting
in a less polarized German party system than in 2017. Besides, only founded
in 2013, the AfD as a completely new player and its electorate were even more
difficult to evaluate for the other parties in terms of chances of winning over
voters. Lastly, the 2017 election campaign was dominated by the migration
issue, which strengthened the AfD’s role in terms of competition, but did
not play a role in 2013. Considering the different competitive situation the
2013 elections took place under, re-running our models on data of the 2013
elections serves as an appropriate test for the validity of our findings.24
In addition, we calculated models in which we pooled the 2013 and 2017
observations and included a dummy variable for the election year. The results
of the 2013 as well as the pooled model are presented as M6 and M7 in Fig. 3.
Again, the results are substantially identical compared to our main models.25
24Analogously to our 2017 models, we combine data from the 2013 federal election
candidate survey (Rattinger et al., 2014) and the post-election voter survey (Rattinger et
al., 2017) from the GLES 2013. The operationalization of the variables is identical to that
described in the research design section above.
25Furthermore, the election year dummy of model M7 did not show significant effects on
PVP or PVP-minus-AVP (see tables B2 and B3 in the supplementary material), meaning
that parties, on average, perceived their voter potentials not differently or more correctly
in 2013 than 2017.
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Note: Results of cross-classified models with two higher-level units as described in the
methods section; regression coefficients and 95% confidence intervals. Own calculations
based on Roßteutscher et al.(2018b; 2018a) and Rattinger et al. (2014; 2017). Solid ver-
tical line represents the coefficients from the main models and the dashed lines their 95%
confidence intervals (Table 1 and Table 2). Graphical presentation is based on Stata’s
’coefplot’ command (Jann 2014). M1 = Jackknife test; M2 = exclusion of AfD as receiv-
ing party; M3 = exclusion of AfD as target party; M4a = experienced candidates only;
M4b = inexperienced candidates only; M5a = elected candidates only; M5b = unelected
candidates only; M6 = application to the 2013 Federal election; M7 = pooled model; M8
= size of receiving party as control; M9 = size of target party as control; M10 = vote gains
of receiving party as control; M11 = vote gains of target party as control; M12 = relative
vote gains as control; M13= political camp as control; M14 = calculation of dependent
variable based on median.
Thirdly, there might be factors influencing parties’ perceptions of their
voter potentials among rival parties’ electorates that, at the same time, influ-
ence their perceptions of perceived left-right proximities. Indeed, there are
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some aspects of parties which are logically, or at least theoretically, linked
to (relative) left-right positions as outlined by the spatial model of competi-
tion. If not accounted for, this could result in biased estimates of our effects
for PLRP and PLRP-minus-VLRP. The first potentially relevant factor in
this regard concerns party size of both the target and the receiving parties.
Another potential factor that could impact the correspondence of PVP and
AVP on the one hand and PLRD and VLRD on the other is whether the re-
ceiving and target party belong to the same political camp. In order to avoid
omitted variable bias, we calculated several additional PVP and PVP-minus-
AVP models in which we controlled for several factors, each at a time: The
receiving and target parties’ size (M8 and M9), vote gains (M10 and M11)
as well as their relative vote gains (M12) and whether both members of the
party pair belong to the same political camp (M13).26 As Fig. 3 shows, in
each of the models including a control variable, our proximity measures still
have positive and statistically significant effects. Furthermore, none of the
control variables show statistically significant effects in either model.
As a final check of the robustness of our findings, we calculated our main
models using an alternative operationalization of our dependent variables.
As measures based on the mean of a distribution are especially sensitive
to outliers, we recalculated our PVP and AVP measures using the median
of the PTWV- and PTV-distributions.27 The coefficients for our indepen-
dent variable are, again, substantively identical to those in the main models
(M14). Without a doubt, the robustness checks imply that our findings are
stable, not only when potentially influential cases are excluded, the sample
of individual candidates for calculating PVP and PLRP is restricted to ex-
perienced or elected candidates only or when our models are applied to other
electoral contexts. The results also hold if factors potentially distorting the
effects of our left-right proximity variables are controlled for and an alter-
native operationalization for our dependent variable is used. We take this
as encouragement that we indeed provided a strong and reliable test for our
hypotheses in the prior section.
26For a variable description see Table B1 in the supplementary material.
27Furthermore, this operationalization resembles the theoretical concept of the median
voter theorem of the spatial theory of party competition. However, for our main models
we chose to follow common practice of empirical research on party (re-)positioning, which
is using mean values.
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6 Conclusion
For political parties, one way of achieving the goal of maximizing their vote
share is to attract voters from rival parties. Consequently, parties have to be
aware of the competitive situation in the sense that they should know what
electoral potentials they have among other parties’ voters. Previous studies
have shown that parties adapt their left-right position in response to public
opinion shifts and to left-right shifts of rival parties. We argued that these
findings do not necessarily imply that parties perceive their voter potentials
among these rivals correctly. Focusing on this capability, we reconsidered the
theoretical arguments of the spatial model of party competition by asking
in how far parties’ perceptions of their voter potentials indeed match their
actual voter potentials. We thus looked at one of the crucial preconditions
for parties’ strategic behavior when it comes to vote maximizing that has not
been investigated yet.
For the empirical investigation, we developed very robust, yet straight-
forward measures of perceived and actual voter potentials for all relevant
parties in a multi-party setting relying on elite- and mass-level survey data.
Applying these measures to the 2017 federal election in Germany, the major
findings of our study are the following: Firstly, the extent to which a party
considers the voters of a rival party as potential voters depends on the per-
ceived left-right proximity to that rival. Secondly, we established that, in
general, there is a positive relationship between perceived and actual voter
potentials. However, this correlation is not very strong. This means that
not all parties perceive their voter potential correctly and, hence, are able
to apply objectively correct strategies of vote maximization. Even if the
party which misperceives its voter potentials the most — the AfD — is ex-
cluded from the analyses, the overall correspondence is not perfect. Thirdly,
we explored in how far spatial factors can account for voter potential mis-
perceptions. Both perceived and actual voter potentials are structured by
left-right considerations, albeit to different extents. This implies that parties’
voter potential misperceptions cannot be a consequence of parties and voters
applying completely different logics when thinking about political compe-
tition. However, our results suggest that parties and voters do not locate
political actors identically on the left-right dimension. This might be due to
diverging understandings of what left and right actually mean or due to fac-
tors limiting the supply- and demand-side’s capabilities to perceive positions
correctly. We showed that there is a systematic link between perceptual dif-
ferences (between parties and voters) and the correctness of voter potential
perceptions. If parties perceive themselves to be ideologically closer to the
voters of other parties than they actually are, they overestimate their elec-
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toral potentials. To validate our findings, we conducted several robustness
checks, none of which led to substantially different results compared to our
main models. For example, distinguishing between different groups of can-
didates (experienced vs. inexperienced or MPs vs. unsuccessful candidates)
or controlling for non-spatial and contextual factors had no effects. Even
excluding the AfD — which is not only a different animal when compared
to other German parties, but which is also rather bad in evaluating its voter
potential from rival parties correctly — does not change the results. Explain-
ing the AfD’s too positive evaluations of its chances to win votes from rival
parties is beyond the scope of this paper. As our robustness tests show, this
cannot be traced back to different levels of political experience because AfD
politicians do not differ systematically from those of the FDP or the Left.
Yet, it is noteworthy that the AfD perceives its own position far more centrist
on the left-right scale than the voters it wants to attract do. In other words,
the placement of the party differs a lot between the party’s perspective and
those of the citizens. While other factors may play a role for the too positive
evaluations, for example, over-the-top optimism due to a strong increase in
vote share since its foundation in early 2013, one can conclude that spatial
misperceptions seem to be of high importance.
Our study constitutes a first step on a novel research agenda. Consider-
ing the only moderate explanatory power of our models, left-right proximities
and variation in these perceptions alone are obviously not sufficient to explain
how voter potential (mis-)perceptions come about. Beyond this empirical ar-
gument, research on parties and citizens alike shows that electoral behavior is
not just influenced by spatial considerations but also by many other factors.
As party utility and the resulting consideration sets are not only based on
spatial but also on non-spatial factors, it seems necessary for future research
to consider non-spatial party characteristics for explaining the (correctness
of) parties’ perceived voter potentials more explicitly. This could, for exam-
ple, also include moderating effects of party size or party leader popularity
on the impact of spatial factors.
Even if future studies stick to the spatial framework, it will be necessary
to extend our approach to more complex conceptualizations of competition –
namely two- or even multi-dimensional competitive spaces. Future research
should therefore investigate spatial party competition regarding other, more
specific issue dimensions, as well as how varying levels of issue salience might
condition both perceived and actual voter potentials. Salience depends on
contexts which themselves provide additional features that potentially affect
parties’ abilities to correctly perceive potentials – for example, the number
of competing parties, party system fragmentation, electoral institutions or
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the degree of voter de-alignment. While the 2017 federal election provides
an instructive test case and while we can show that results are valid also
for the substantively different electoral context of 2013, it will be instructive
to apply our approach to and test our hypotheses also in larger-scale com-
parative set-ups. Lastly, we want to point out that the focus of this study
was on political parties in order to build a bridge to the most influential
literature looking at party competition and party strategies. The data used,
however, also allows for carrying out analyses on the level of individual can-
didates. This would bring about an even more nuanced picture of how voter
potentials are perceived by political elites and what factors distort these per-
ceptions, for example, politician-specific factors such as personality traits,
chances of winning the mandate, perception biases or regional peculiarities.
Considering, again, the results for the AfD it might also be worthwhile to
investigate the effect of populist attitudes on voter potential perceptions.
Overall, the analysis represents a valid addition to but also has several
implications for the literature dealing with spatial party competition. To
start with, our study provides empirical evidence for a core assumption of the
spatial model which has never been tested explicitly: Parties indeed perceive
their voter potentials among rival parties based on left-right proximities.
This also underlines the continuing relevance of the left-right dimension for
structuring party competition. However, we also show that not all parties are
equally able to perceive their voter potentials correctly. While we agree that
parties adapt their positions with the goal of winning votes from other parties
— as the Downsian approach suggests — some of them, as we show, act on the
basis of rather incorrect information and assumptions. In other words, party
behavior might be rational but at the same time does not lead to optimal
results. More generally, this also speaks in favor of allowing for more party-
specific models of competition. Finally, the findings stress the importance for
researchers in the field of spatial competition to consider different perceptions
of left-right competition and placements. Earlier research already pointed out
that there is variation between citizens in this regard. This study provides
evidence that there are also differences between parties as well as between
citizens and parties. Moreover, these differences are systematic in the sense
that they are connected to deviations of perceived and actual voter potentials.
Building strategies to attract rival parties’ voters based on their per-
ceptions of voter potentials works better for some parties than for others.
Although several other factors determine parties’ perceptions, they need to
understand the spatial nature of competition in order to perceive their voter
potentials correctly, and consequently, to make strategically correct decisions.
More precisely, they need to understand how voters of different parties per-
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ceive competition on relevant dimensions of political conflict. These findings
are not a challenge to the Downsian model and more recent work by, for
example, Adams and others. On the contrary, a core assumption of the spa-
tial approach is validated by our study — keeping in mind all the problems
of generalizing from a single-case study. However, the picture is more com-
plex than existing studies assume. The spatial mechanisms at work differ
not in their effect for perceiving voter potentials but in their substantive
quality. Consequently, future studies should allow for more heterogeneity of
parties’ capacities which, at the same time, could be used as an additional
explanatory factor of party success or failure.
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Europawahl 2009. Länderübergreifende und ebenenspezifische Befunde”.
In: Superwahljahr 2009. Vergleichende Analysen aus Anlass der Wahlen
zum Deutschen Bundestag und zum Europäischen Parlament. Ed. by Jens
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